448. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)/1/ Washington, April 3, 1963. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 Laos. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. No drafting information appears on the source text. SUBJECTImplications of Quinim's Assassination In response to your request we have examined the implications of Quinim's assassination for the situation in Laos and for United States policy. A brief account of our findings follows. Our more detailed study is attached./2/ /2/Not printed. According to the study, April 2, Foreign Minister Quinim Pholsena was assassinated on the night of April 1 by a guard at his residence. A neutralist source contended that the assassination was carried out in accordance with a Kong Le plan. We do not believe that Quinim's assassination will lead to an immediate change in Pathet Lao tactics. Any drastic change--such as an all-out attack in the Plaine des Jarres--would presumably require advance consultation with Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi. It is unlikely that any of them would consider the assassination of a neutralist--even one as close to the Communists as Quinim--a sufficient threat to their position to require them to reverse their present policies and risk a confrontation with the United States. Accordingly we see as most likely a continuation of present tactics--keeping the situation in the Plaine des Jarres tense, cutting off the trickle of supplies still reaching Kong Le from North Vietnam, possibly resuming attacks on supply flights, and probably trying to ensure that Quinim is replaced by a neutralist equally favorable to their interests. In the circumstances, the United States might: 1. Make it clear, if necessary and appropriate, that the United States policy continues to support the coalition government and the Geneva Agreements. 2. As an interim solution for the Foreign Minister portfolio, nudge Souvanna to take it concurrently. 3. Encourage Souvanna to provide leadership to the neutralists and stand firm against Pathet Lao pressures on the basis that Quinim's assassination is an internal neutralist matter. Consult with the British and the French, and with the Indians and the Canadians to make parallel approaches to Souvanna. The purpose of these actions would be to bolster the neutralists who will presumably be urging Souvanna along the same lines. 4. Continue to bolster Kong Le's military position along present lines but without being too obvious. Increase pressure to get the ICC into the Plaine des Jarres. 5. Reassure the Soviets, and through them Peiping and Hanoi, that our policy remains unchanged and that our main concern is to prevent the situation from deteriorating. Also, consult with the British for possible action by the co-chairmen. 6. While withholding United States military moves into Southeast Asia which could be misinterpreted by the Communists and act as a trigger rather than a deterrent, consult with the Thai against a contingency which might necessitate military intervention. Meantime the United States should consider responses in the event of renewed Pathet Lao attacks on supply flights. 449. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Paris/1/ Washington, April 8, 1963, 9:13 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 Laos. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cross, cleared by Lloyd in S/S, and approved by Koren. Rusk was attending the Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the SEATO Council, April 8-10. Additional documentation is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XXIII. Tosec 16. To be delivered to the Secretary by 8 a.m. Following is wrap-up on Laos requested by Secretary: Situation Military situation remains very confused but it is fairly certain that Xieng Khouang ville and possibly Khang Khay have been seized by dissidents backed by PL with at least psychological and possibly material support from VM located in area./2/ Kong Le seems still in control over the main PDJ airfield and roads leading to it. Ultimate communist intentions are not discernible now but Kong Le himself feels that entire PDJ is menaced and that he may not be able hold. /2/According to telegram 1400 from Vientiane, April 8, the Embassy concluded that the Pathet Lao, using dissident neutralists as a front and North Vietnamese as psychological support, were bent on overtaking Kong Le's military positions one by one. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Laos) In Vientiane situation also tense but Quinim cremation went off safely despite apparently serious possibilities of violence. In funeral oration Souvanna made solemn appeal for unity. Fact Souvanna asked ICC to establish presence on PDJ became public but Souphanouvong has reportedly opposed. We have no reports yet on action ICC intends. Souvanna also saw Soviet and British ambs and requested intercession their govts with NVN and PL to withdraw VM cadres and stop PL attacks. (As of 1900 Washington time April 8 these appeals to co-Chairman not yet publicized and although he did so privately with UK and Soviet ambs Souvanna has not publicly put blame for fighting on communist side.) Steps US taking FYI Only. On military side US has encouraged FAR and Meo ADCs to move so as to be in better position to assist Kong Le or provide him with withdrawal route and we are indirectly supplying neutralist forces with emergency materiel by various means. However we are not encouraging aggressive action by FAR or Meo unless such action would specifically assist survival Kong Le since we wish avoid escalation. End FYI. Unger has been urging Souvanna to: a) seek ICC presence on PDJ, b) make appeal to co-Chairmen, c) give KL open public support and place blame for fighting on communist side, d) make trip to PDJ himself or with Souphanouvong. Unger has also been instructed to work with British and French to develop specific means where Soviet amb could engage himself in PDJ situation. Thompson saw Dobrynin April 6 and stressed our concern over situation./3/ /3/Memorandum of conversation, April 6. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, 1961-1964, Special US-USSR File, 1963) Suggested talking points 1. Situation is most serious since Agreements went into effect since communist attacks if unchecked could mean destruction of center force on which balanced coalition depends. 2. However, recourse to Geneva machinery can restore situation if all parties concerned act positively in accordance their obligations under Agreements. 3. Therefore reactions of communist side provides real test of their intentions towards Geneva Agreements and peace in area. 4. If the communist side fails to act so that peace is restored and the neutralist force preserved, the neutral solution for Laos will collapse with obvious grave consequences for us all. Dept press Linc White said following in answer to question PDJ situation: "Our information is that the Kong Le neutralist forces have been attacked by the pro-communist Pathet Lao, and there are indications that they are supported by some Viet Minh military personnel. We have no detailed information on how serious the fighting is in the Plain of Jars. The fighting now going on not only appears to be a serious violation of the cease-fire, but if it continues will endanger the implementation of the Geneva Accords with all the dire consequences that such a breakdown will mean for Laos. In these circumstances, we consider it incumbent on the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Accords and the ICC to take prompt and effective action to stop the fighting which has been instigated by the pro-communist Pathet Lao, and to ensure that the cease-fire is restored. Such action is essential in order to preserve the independence and neutrality of Laos."/4/ /4/The source text is unsigned. 450. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/ Paris, April 9, 1963, 11 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Laos. Secret; Operational Immediate; No Other Distribution. Secto 17. Eyes only for Acting Secretary from Secretary. Following suggestions are based upon somewhat limited information available in Paris and presumably in Washington about actual situation in Plaine des Jarres and series of group and personal discussions with SEATO Foreign Ministers. 1. Souvanna Phouma is key to present situation in Laos. He is custodian of governmental legitimacy and has had public commitment from all signatories of Geneva agreements. It seems to me that we should take steps to encourage Souvanna Phouma to commit himself publicly to integrity of Geneva agreements and to insist that Pathet Lao and Viet-Minh (according to Kong Le) action against neutralist forces is direct violation those agreements. I would suggest therefore that Unger be directed to present issues to Souvanna Phouma in consultation with British and French colleagues Vientiane. 2. Further, there is one potential asset in Laos which we have never succeeded in mobilizing behind a genuinely independent and neutral country. This is the attitude of the King and the tradition of royalty in that country. The King must do something about the views he expressed to the President in Washington/2/ and risk the throne if he expects anyone else to risk anything for Laos. I would suggest therefore that Unger see the King and emphasize necessity for King to give full public support to Souvanna Phouma and the concept of an independent and neutral Laos and that he be prepared to take this issue to the country with a complete commitment of his own person and royal institutions at this juncture. It should be made obvious to him that there is no room in communism for royalty and that he has nothing to lose and everything to gain by a maximum effort to insure the independence of his country. /3/ /2/See Documents 444 and 445. /3/In telegram 953 to Vientiane, April 10, the Department suggested that "another effort to engage King personally in present crisis would be in order." If Unger was able to spare the time during the crisis, he was to seek an audience with Savang and persuade him to appeal to the contending factions and make a dramatic gesture, like a tour of the contested provinces or, at least, issue a public statement. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Laos) 3. A further asset which should be pressed to the limit is Khrushchev's own personal commitment to President Kennedy that an independent and neutral Laos is his own objective. Admitting there may be some limitations on Soviet ability to guarantee a particular result with Hanoi or Peiping, nevertheless we should press upon Khrushchev the fact that his own good faith is at stake and that we expect compliance with his solemn pledges on this subject. Lord Home has instructed British Ambassador Moscow to press this matter with Gromyko personally. I believe that it would not be wise for the President to press Khrushchev on Laos in a personal message until after the message which we were discussing just before I left Washington. If that message has not already gone, a direct and simple message on Laos might be included but I would not send a special message on Laos until that communication has gone forward. 4. I further believe we should give whatever practical assistance we can to Kong Le and the Meo and Phoumi forces in the general vicinity of Plaines des Jarres. This should be done with Souvanna Phouma's knowledge. In fact, I can see some advantage in having Souvanna Phouma request the two co-chairmen to insure that the neutralist forces are adequately supplied with the resources needed to conform to the understandings of the Geneva agreements. 5. I do believe that it is important for us to try to achieve and maintain a situation in which any action which we might subsequently be forced to take would be in support of the Geneva agreements. I do not rule out the possibility that several signatories of the Geneva agreements might take military action to establish a position in Laos on the basis that such action is designed to permit the Geneva agreements to be executed as originally intended. Apart from maintaining general character of cease-fire line, it is not inconceivable to me that South Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Thailand, as well as the US and certain other Allies might occupy certain positions in Laos pending a determination as to whether or not the Geneva agreements are to be executed. However, from available information I would think it premature to move in the military field beyond supplies to Kong Le and Phoumi forces but this contingency might arise if Pathet Laos in fact attempt to press in the Plaines des Jarres. 6. I should like to re-emphasize the importance of Souvanna Phouma's position and attitude. We would be in a very strong position in supporting him against treacherous Pathet Lao opposition to Geneva arrangements but would be in very difficult position were he to quit or equivocate on issues raised by recent events in Plaines des Jarres. 7. It is my impression that the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, and Philippines are seriously concerned and would support above program. Pakistan can be eliminated from any serious participation or attention to Laotian question. Thailand would hope that strong action would be taken to prevent Communist takeover of Laos but may be somewhat careful after disillusionment previous efforts on Laotian question. However, Thanat appears to have much more confidence in basic intentions of Souvanna Phouma than was confessed a year ago, but he is obviously worried about whether we shall march uphill and then down again as he felt we did earlier. 8. Looking ahead and not for immediate decision is question of possible military action in face of threatened takeover of Laos by Pathet Lao and Viet-Minh. After experience of past two years and extraordinary effort we have made to find peaceful solution with Khrushchev and through Geneva agreements, I do not believe we are obligated to attempt military action under conditions of greatest disadvantage by restricting our forces to landlocked area of Laos. I would urge serious contingency planning aimed at a clear warning to Hanoi that continued military action in Laos would lead to direct action against North Viet-Nam. Our reluctance to escalate should not require us to commit doughboys to a frustrating and unrewarding effort if we can shoot at the Viet-Minh from the air and sea at less cost to us and maximum cost to them. In other words it seems to me that Geneva agreements must succeed or we must take the handcuffs off ourselves in deciding what we think about the security of Southeast Asia. Rusk 451. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 4/1/63-4/19/63. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Regarding attachment 3, a paper on the critical situation concerning the Counter Insurgency Piaster Fund for Vietnam, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. III, Document 87. MEMORANDUM FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON APRIL 10, 1963
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